Private Industry Notification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION • CYBER DIVISION

23 May 2025

PIN Number

20250523-001

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This PIN has been released **TLP:CLEAR**

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Silent Ransom Group Targeting Law Firms

Summary

The cyber threat actor Silent Ransom Group (SRG), also known as Luna Moth, Chatty Spider, and UNC3753, is targeting law firms using information technology (IT) themed social engineering calls, then sending an individual posing as an IT support employee to the firm in-person, after which they insert a storage device into a computer to steal sensitive data to extort the victims. While SRG has historically victimized companies in many sectors, starting Spring 2023, the group has consistently targeted US-based law firms, likely due to the highly sensitive nature of legal industry data.

**SRG targets other sectors as well, to include companies in the medical industry and insurance industry. However, most of SRG's victims are law firms or companies with similar naming conventions*.

Threat

As of April 2025, SRG was observed changing their tactics to calling individuals and posing as an employee from the victim's IT department. SRG then sent an individual in person to access the computer and insert a storage device into the computer.

SRG has been operating since 2022 and has primarily been known for their callback phishing emails, masquerading as well-known businesses who offer subscription plans. Typically, SRG phishing emails purport to charge small amounts of "subscription fees" as they are less likely to generate immediate suspicion. In order to cancel the fake subscription, the victim was instructed to call the threat actor who emails a link which downloads remote access software giving the actor access to their device or system. Once the actor has established persistent access, the threat actors will seek to identify valuable information to exfiltrate, before sending a ransom notice to the victim threatening to share the victim's data if a ransom is not paid.

Once in the victim's device, a typical SRG attack involves minimal privilege escalation and quickly pivots to data exfiltration conducted through "WinSCP" (Windows Secure Copy) or a hidden or renamed version of "Rclone." If the compromised device does not have administrative privileges, WinSCP portable is used to exfiltrate victim data. Although this tactic has only been observed recently, it has been highly effective and resulted in multiple compromises.

Similar to their phishing emails posing as a company with a subscription, once SRG exfiltrates data, they extort the victim by sending them a ransom email threatening to sell or post the data online. SRG will also call employees at a victim company to pressure them into engaging in ransom negotiations. SRG has developed a publicly available site to post victim data, however, they are inconsistent in their use of the site, and do not always follow through on posting victim data.

Indicators

Recent SRG campaigns leave few artifacts on compromised machines. They are also unlikely to be flagged by traditional antivirus products because SRG generally uses legitimate system management or remote access tools to carry out the attacks. Network defenders are therefore advised to treat the following as potential, but not definitive, indications of SRG activity:

- New unauthorized downloads of system management or remote access tools, including Zoho Assist, Syncro, AnyDesk, Splashtop, or Atera.
- Unidentified, unauthorized individuals attempting to access computers and claiming to be IT support.
- WinSCP or Rclone connection made to an external IP address.
- Emails from an unnamed group claiming data was stolen.

- Voicemails or phone calls from an unnamed group claiming data was stolen.
- Employees receiving unsolicited phone calls from individuals claiming to work in their IT department.

Recommendations

Implement basic cyber hygiene to include being suspicious, robust passwords, multifactor authentication, and installation of antivirus tools. For SRG threat actors:

- Verify the credentials of all individuals accessing firm spaces
- Conduct staff training on resisting phishing attempts
- Develop and communicate policies surrounding when and how company's IT will authenticate themselves with employees
- Maintain regular backups of company data
- Implement two-factor authentication for all employees

Information Requested

The FBI is seeking any information from SRG victims that can be legally shared, including:

- Ransom note copy
- Phone number used by threat actor
- Communications with threat actor to include voicemails
- Cryptocurrency wallet information
- Special sensitivities of stolen data
- Original call back message or phishing email

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the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

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